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Background 
Illicit drug trade is one of the most dangerous and fast developing forms of 
transborder crime in the post-Soviet space. Its structures are stimulated by high 
profitability (1000% and more) and very able to react to challenges faster than their 
opposing state agencies opposing them. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia had to 
protect its new national borders. At a total length of (11 000 km, the security issues 
related to them can be compared to a combination of both the EU and the US’s 
“problem borders”. The border between Russia and Kazakhstan raise the greatest 
challenges for the authorities, as it is the most common route for the transporting of 
heroin, which is by far the most harmful hard drug for Russian society. The majority of 
the estimated 1,5 million Russian drug addicts depends on this drug and Russia's 
heroin market is considered to be the biggest in Europe. 
Under these circumstances, Russia has to develop its own model of anti-narcotic 
policy, one that should be even more effective than other countries. However, it is 
difficult to evaluate the issue because information is dispersed through various state 
agencies. At the same time, information which is publicly available is often evidently 
distorted. In the fields of illegal drug trade and developing national anti-narcotic policy, 
independent expert estimations of the situation are pre-conditions for increasing 
effectiveness. 
1 The Geography of Drug Smuggling through Post-
Soviet Borders of the Russian Federation 
1.1 Main Drug Smuggling Routes 
The problem of smuggling through the Russia- Kazakhstan, Russia-Georgia, and 
Russia-Azerbaijan borders is connected to heroin production in Afghanistan and also 
(through Russia-Kazakhstan border) marijuana and hashish production in post-Soviet 
Central Asia. The traffic of marijuana from Ukraine and the Transcaucasian states, 
poppy straw from Ukraine, and synthetic drugs from the EU through Byelorussia, 
Ukraine, and Baltic states have considerable impact on the Russian drug market. 
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The traffic of heroin and raw opium (for converting to heroin in Russia) from 
Afghanistan is the most dangerous. In the 1990s this country became one of the main 
drug producing hub and the absolute leader in terms of the supply of opiates, producing 
almost 75-80% of their global volume [Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003]. 
There are several routes for opium trafficking. It is converted to heroin in 
underground laboratories both within Afghanistan and outside. The two main routes for 
opiate trafficking are the Balkan route and the Northen route. The first passes through 
Iran (or to Pakistan to the port of Karachi and then by sea as a variant), Turkey, the 
Balkan countries and then to Southern and Western Europe. The Northern route or “the 
Silk way” passes through Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan or the Uzbek part of the Fergana 
Valley, onto Kazakhstan and Russia, Belarus, Ukraine or the Northern Russian 
provinces towards EU countries. Various branches of the Northern route pass through 
the Afghanistan-Turkmenistan border to Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, in most cases 
entering Russian territory after that [Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003]. 
Finally, there are also various "combined" ways: for example, Afghanistan-Iran-
Azerbaijan or Armenia-Georgia-Russia. For traffickers, each of these routes has 
advantages and dis-advantages. The advantages of "the Balkan route" are the shorter 
distance between Afghanistan and EU countries and close ties between ethnic mafia 
groups consisting of citizens of Turkey, Iran, and EU states. At the same time, this route 
crosses more "risky" zones, such as Iran, which is a world leader in the seizure of 
opiates. "The Silk route" attracts drug smugglers by the relative transparency of most 
post-Soviet borders, the possibilities of using clan and ethnic ties for criminal operations 
in these states, and the huge capacity of the Russian heroin market. There is also little 
serious competition to opiates from cocaine or synthetic drugs. However, the use of 
"the Northern route" for the more solvent EU market is hampered by the longer 
distance, the increased number of middlemen, and the stricter migration regime that the 
EU established for citizens of CIS countries. This is why EU citizens, particularly from 
the new members states (Lithuania, Poland and others) play such a great part in the 
westwards drug-trafficking from the post-Soviet space.
1
 The Northern route is more 
frequently used for supplies of opiates to Russia and post-Soviet countries while for the 
EU heroin markets, the drugs are transported mainly through the Balkan route. 
                                            
1
 For example, Polish and Lithuanian citizens were among narco-couriers arrested in 2004 for an attempt 
to transport large lots of heroin to Germany by "the Northern route". [Bi-Annual Seizure Report 2004, 
346]. 
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The global cannabis market differs from the heroin one. The relative cheapness of 
cannabis (in the CIS it costs 0.3-0.4 dollars per gram [Afghanistan Opium Survey 
2003]) means that a more significant volume of this drug is smuggled although this in 
turn increases the risks of discovery. Favorable natural conditions for large-scaled 
planting throughout Central Asia also influences production. The key cannabis 
trafficking routes are much shorter than those for opiates. Central Asia doesn't have 
serious influence over the global conjuncture, but there are some regions of 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (especially the valley of the Chu (Shu) river) which are 
large suppliers to Russia. 
The transportation of amphetamine-type stimulants and cocaine is mainly in the 
opposite direction, that is, from Europe to Asia. While the volume of these flows is much 
modest the problem should not be underestimated. It is important to take into 
consideration, that the number of synthetic drug consumers in the world is second only 
to the number of cannabis users. The widespread stereotype that associates the fight 
against drugs with seizures of heroin is, to some extent, favorable for the expansion of 
synthetic drugs for Russia, mainly from external sources. 
At more than 7500-kilometer long, the Russia Kazakhstan border is the longest 
continuous boundary in the world and it has serious importance for drug trafficking and 
the fight against it. When smugglers cross it, they find themselves in another region, 
another price zone, one of the largest transit points to EU, and at the same time, in one 
of the largest drug markets. According to Kazakhstan experts, 30% of imported 
narcotics are consumed in the country [Ashimbayev et. al. 2004: 6] while 70% is 
transported outside and most to Russia. The statistical information on seizures at the 
Kazakhstan-Russian border offers some evidence of the huge scale of narco-trafficking. 
For the period between 1997 and 2004, when the South-Eastern Regional Branch of 
Border Guard Service (responsible for the most of the Russia-Kazakhstan border 
except the territories of Astrakhan province and the Republic of Altai) has existed, 
officials seized more than 3.5 tons of heroin. In 2004 only, they seized 416 kg of drugs 
including 100 kg of heroin [Interfax-Ural 2004]. Unfortunately, the border and customs 
services don't always have common statistical information concerning seizures. 
Almost every province bordering Kazakhstan (with the exception of the Republic of 
Altai, where the borderland is mountainous and there is no stable trans-boundary 
communication) is an area of large-scale drug-trafficking. Delivery routes for opiates 
and cannabis drugs cross the border at the same checkpoints. Taking into account the 
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drug-related statistical information analyzed, the main flows of smuggling drugs aim at 
Moscow and St. Petersburg, the resort regions of the Northern Caucasus (especially 
Krasnodar krai), major cities in the Volga and Ural regions (first of all, Samara and 
Yekaterinburg) and Western Siberia (Tiumen, Khanty-Mansiysk etc.). 
Analyzing information about drug seizures at the Russian-Kazakhstan border, the 
author can surmise that in the last few years the main trans-boundary drug-trafficking 
routes have gradually been shifting eastwards. According to official information, the 
Siberian Federal Area is ranked first for heroin seizures in Russia (21% of the whole 
volume).
2
 This tendency can be explained by the relative short distance of the “Eastern 
direction” and, in contrast to other Russian provinces, a higher purchasing power in the 
gas and oil producing region. This market is increasingly attractive with the continued 
rise in oil prices. 
The Northern and partly the Balkan routes pass through Russian borders with the 
Transcaucasian states. These routes run from Central Asia and Iran through Azerbaijan 
and Georgia towards Russia or the EU countries. Within Russia, narcotics are 
transported northwards and to the "rich" resort areas of Krasnodar and Stravropol krais. 
The main direction of Trans-caucasian drug-trafficking is through the Baku - Rostov 
“motorway” (through Azerbaijan and the Republic of Dagestan), and also partly through 
the Ossetian part of the Russian-Georgian border. For a long time Chechnya, was a 
comfortable hub for the trafficking of drugs originating in Afghanistan. The drug trade at 
the Abkhazian area of Russia-Georgia border is less developed in comparison with 
other parts of this region. Nevertheless, the marijuana growing in Abkhazia and 
subsequent smuggling to Krasnodar krai, is considered a widespread illegal business in 
the area. From 1993 until May 1998 Russian border guards, responsible for this 
section, managed to seize more than 5 kg of drugs [Schiogoleva 1998] while in 2002 
customs officers confiscated 10 kg of narcotic substances.
3
 
Talking into account the volume of drug seizures, the "Caucasian route" is by no 
means the main channel for drug smuggling. In 2002 representatives of the North 
Caucasian Branch of the Border Guard Service seized 60 kg narcotics [Rossiya - 
                                            
2
 The information was obtained by Dr. Grigory Olekh from Siberian Federal District's Branch of the 
Federal Agency for the Control over Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances. See: [Golunov et al. 2004: 
21]. 
3
 The information has been obtained from Southern Operations Customs (Rostov, Russia) by Dr. 
Nataliya Batischeva in August 2005. 
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Regiony 2001] while in 2001 they confiscated only 6,7 kg.
4
 It is important to note that 
from 2001 till 2004, in the Abkhazian and Ossetian parts of the border, Russian 
customs officers seized only marijuana and that the largest volume confiscated at the 
Russia-Azerbaijan border was only 8,2 kg.
5
 However, from a considered point of view, 
the Caucasus is one of the potentially most dangerous directions. In most cases, the 
routes running through the western post-Soviet borders of Russia are used for 
trafficking of opiates towards the EU. At the same time, synthetic drugs, cannabis and 
poppy straw are trafficked towards Russia. As regards the Russia-Ukraine border, 
according to Ukrainian sources, the main smuggling routes go through border points in 
Rostov, Belgorod and Briansk oblasts [Kovalenko et al. 2001]. Through the Russia-
Byelorussia border, the main drug trafficking routes pass along the transborder 
motorways and railways of Briansk, Gomel, Smolensk, and Mogilyov oblasts. In the 
Baltic area, the smugglers make frequent use of two motorways and two railways, 
connecting Pskov oblast and Latvia, a motorway and a railway connecting Leningrad 
oblast and Estonia, and the exclave Kaliningrad oblast. 
It should be noted that amongst Russia's western post-Soviet boundaries the 
Ukrainian border is distinguished by the most intensive exchange of illicit drugs. For a 
long time, the balance of such exchange was in favor of Ukraine because of poppy 
straws' supplies to Russia, but since 2000 taking into account their quantitative and 
qualitative characteristics, the incoming and outgoing flows can be considered to be 
comparable. 
1.2 Regional Geography of the Dissemination of Illicit Drugs 
A correct estimation of the scale or at least the trends in the dissemination of illicit 
drugs in Russia is a necessary condition for adequate policy making. Unfortunately, at 
present this can not be considered solved. Estimates originate mainly from several 
state departments (Federal Agency for the Control over Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances – Gosnarkokontrol, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Federal Security Service, 
Federal Customs Service, Ministry of Health Care and Social Development) with the 
                                            
4
 The information from the speech of the Head of the Northern Caucasian Branch of Russian Federal 
Border Guard Service general-colonel E. V. Bolkhovitinov at the press conference organized 15 January 
2002 (news release obtained from the Stavropol office Northern Caucasian Branch of Russian Federal 
Border Guard Service). 
5
 Calculated by the information obtained from Southern Operations Customs (Rostov, Russia) by Dr. 
Nataliya Batischeva in August 2005. 
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information often being partial and not correlating with the information of other 
departments. Independent expertise is weak, partly because of the lack of publicly 
available information. 
The problems concerning a correct evaluation of the issues can be illustrated by the 
divergence in the estimation of the number of drug addicts' in Russia. From autumn 
2004 until summer 2005, state officials from various departments increased this number 
from 2 million - Prosecutor-General Vladimir Ustinov, November 2004 [Igoshina 2004], 
to 4 million - the Minister of Interior Affairs Rashid Nurgaliev, December 2004 [Cry.ru 
2004], and 3-8 million - Director of the Department for Interdepartmental Interaction in 
the Preventive Sphere of Gosnarkokontol Boris Tselinsky, June 2005 [NEWsru.com 
2005]. In July 2005 the Ministry of Health Care and Social Development declared that 
there are 1,5 million drug addicts and that 6 million people in Russia have at some point 
taken narcotics [Mironov 2005]. The mass-media and officials, including those from 
Gosnarkokontrol, often present the situation as catastrophic. Wanting to persuade 
society to take extraordinary measures, they focus attention on the number of 6 million. 
The situation at the regional level is similar: in order to estimate the number of drug 
addicts some officials multiply the number of registered drug addicts by four, others by 
ten. 
In order to improve estimations concerning the role of various routes in the Russian 
drug trade, the dynamics of drug addiction and drug-related crimes in both border and 
transit regions will be analyzed using the following data: 
• The number and relative share per 100,000 of officially registered addicts at 
regional narcotic health centers; 
• The annual increase in the number of these citizens,  
• The number and share per 100,000 of drug-related crimes for the period 1999-
2004. This information was obtained from The Russian State Statistical 
Committee (Goskomstat) in November 2005. 
It should be understood that the this data is cannot be said to be representative. The 
number of officially registered drug addicts in Russia is only a fraction of their real 
amount and this varies from province to province depending on the effectiveness of 
local social policy. Many drug-related crimes are not registered as such despite the fact 
that a great share of registered crimes are committed by addicts. This statistical 
information only reflects some of the manifestations of drug-related activity detected by 
the law-enforcement bodies. Taking this into account, the author will focus not so much 
on quantitative indicators and estimations as on the relative position of a province 
SERGEY GOLUNOV: DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A CHALLENGE FOR RUSSIA 
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compared with other provinces using the above mentioned indicators. If the tendencies 
established by the presence of several indicators coincide, then the reliability of the 
comparative conclusions is considered adequate. 
In order to identify tendencies in the development of drug addiction and drug-related 
criminality for 1999-2004 regions were ranked by both relative and absolute indicators. 
Focusing on these ten regions can be justified by the fact that these provide more than 
50% of registered drug addicts and 35-45% of drug-related crimes in Russia. By the 
number of officially registered drug addicts, Moscow has constantly ranked first among 
other Russian provinces, with the only exception of Samara oblast in 2001. From 1999-
2004 the top ten provinces constantly included Altai, Krasnodar, and Primorsky krais, 
Irkutsk, Kemerovo, Novosibirsk, Rostov, Sverdlovsk, and Tiumen oblasts. Among these 
provinces (and other regions, which have been among leaders in 1999-2004) three 
regions border Kazakhstan (Altai krai, Tiumen and Novosibirsk oblasts
6
), one area 
(Krasnodar krai) is on the border with Georgia, while two regions (Krasnodar krai and 
Rostov oblast) border with Ukraine. 
The highest annual increase in the number of drug addicts was registered in 
Moscow (with the exception of 2001 when Moscow ranked second after Krasnodar krai, 
and in 2004 when it was also behind Irkutsk oblast). The top ten provinces very often 
include Krasnodar krai, Irkutsk, Kemerovo, Rostov, Samara, and Tiumen oblasts. 
Among 15 regions that belonged in this top ten group throughout the period, 6 were 
border provinces, four of them bordering Kazakhstan (Altai, Krasnodar krais, 
Novosibirsk, Rostov, Tiumen, and Cheliabinsk oblasts). 
The share of drug addicts in a population can influence levels of social tension, if it 
is accepted that the number of registered drug addicts in various regions is 
proportionate to their real number. According to the mentioned indicator, in 1999-2004 
regions ranked the first were as follows: Tomsk oblast (1999), Tiumen oblast (2000), 
Samara oblast (2001, 2004), and Khanty-Mansiysky Autonomous Okrug (2003). The 
top ten included 14 Russian regions, among which 4 bordered Kazakhstan Astrakhan, 
Novosibirsk, Omsk, and Tiumen oblasts), 1 (Krasnodar krai) - Georgia and Ukraine. By 
the annual growth of drug addicts' share among leaders were Tiumen oblast (1999), 
Khanty- Mansiysky Autonomous Okrug (2000), Kemerovo oblast (2001), Primorsky krai 
                                            
6
 From the considered point of view border region means a province, through which great legal and illegal 
flows run. In this section the Samara oblast is not regarded as a border region, though it has 5 km border 
with Kazakhstan, because there are no communication ways in this part of the border. At the same time 
Samara oblast is one of the leaders in Russia by drug consumption and drugrelated criminality 
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(2002-2003), Irkutsk oblast (2004); Besides, the top ten frequently included Altai and 
Krasnodar krais, Samara and Novosibirsk oblasts. Twenty provinces were among 
leaders in some years, including 6 border regions (Altai and Krasnodar krais, 
Novosibirsk, Orenburg, Rostov, and Tiumen oblasts
7
) 4 of that border Kazakhstan. 
By the number of drug related crimes the city of Moscow ranked the first in 2000, 
2002-2004, while Saint-Petersburg was the leader in 1999 and 2001. The top ten often 
included Novosibirsk, Rostov, Samara, Sverdlovsk and Tiumen oblasts. From 1999 
until 2004 16 regions belonged to the top ten, among them 5 (Krasnodar krai, 
Novosibirsk, Rostov, Tiumen and Cheliabinsk oblasts) were border provinces including 
bordering Kazakhstan. 
The share of drug-related crimes per 100 000 people was the largest in Saint-
Petersburg (1999), Samara (2000), Astrakhan oblasts (2001), Primorsky krai (2002-
2003), Khanty-Mansiysky Autonomous Okrug (2004). The top ten frequently included 
oblasts in Krasnodar and Primorsky krais, Novosibirsk, Samara, Tiumen, and Tomsk. 
Seventeen provinces were in the top ten in 1999-2004, among them 7 boundary 
provinces (Krasnodar krai, Astrakhan, Novosibirsk, Kurgan, Omsk, Rostov, and Tiumen 
oblasts) 5 of which bordered Kazakhstan. Taking into account the absolute and relative 
indicators for 1999 until 2004 and considering them in aggregate, the top five
8
 included 
Novosibirsk, Samara, and Tiumen oblasts, Krasnodar and Primorsky krais. Only two of 
these provinces (Krasnodar Krai and Tiumen oblast) have borders with post-Soviet 
states.  
By 2004 the top ten had included 46 provinces, 9 of which bordered Kazakhstan but 
only Tiumen oblast, Altai krai and Novosibirsk oblast were in these top tens frequently, 
one province - Krasnodar krai bordered with Georgia and two - Krasnodar krai and 
Rostov oblast bordered with Ukraine. It is significant that no one Russian province on 
the border with Belarus or the Baltic states has ever belonged to the group of “leaders” 
in 1999-2004. 
There are similar tendencies in drug consumption in the CIS countries bordering 
Russia. In Kazakhstan for the period of 2003-2004 Almaty and Karaganda oblasts (the 
                                            
7
 The republics of Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachayevo-Tcherkessia are also do not considered to be 
border regions as these areas there are no transboundary communications with Georgia and there are 
very little possibilities to arrange cross-border drug smuggling. However, during the period of 1999-2004 
these North-Caucasian republics belonged to the top ten according to relative indicators. 
8
 In this case just five (not ten) regions are definitely distinguished by the aggregate of the mentioned 
indicators for the period from 1999 until 2004. Other regions can be distinguished only by separate 
indicators for shorter periods. 
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latter is the main miner's region of the country) were the leaders in narcotic 
consumption and drug-related criminality. Among Kazakhstani provinces bordering 
Russia, the East Kazakhstan oblast ranked the third according to the number of drug-
related crimes and the fifth according to the number of officially registered drug addicts. 
Pavlodar and Aktiubinsk oblasts ranked the same as East Kazakhstan province 
according to the relative share of drug addicts among the total regional population.
9
 In 
Ukraine, the regions bordering Russia (among them were such miner's centers as 
Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts and the main resort zone of the country – the 
Autonomous Republic of the Crimea) ranked from second to forth place according to 
officially registered number of drug addicts. This was only surpassed by the 
Dnipropetrovsk oblast [Region Online 2003]. According to the relative share of drug 
addicts, these regions ranked from the third to the fifth. It should be noted that Kharkiv 
oblast, one of the largest regions at the Ukraine-Russia borderland, was not among the 
provinces top-ranked by the mentioned indices. In Belarus the clear leaders in drug 
consumption are the city of Minsk (1917 registered addicts in 2004), Gomel oblast 
bordering Russia (1454), and the Brest oblast bordering Poland (797). According to the 
corresponding relative indicators, regions' positions remain the same. However, other 
than in the Gomel oblast regions bordering Russia, Vitebsk and Mogilyov oblasts 
ranked seventh and eighth [Belorusskoye 2005], despite the fact that very important 
trans-boundary motorways and railways pass through Mogiliov oblast. 
The analysis shows that the border or transit location of a region is important but not 
decisive for the dissemination and consumption of illicit drugs (especially hard) in the 
provinces of the Russian Federation and neighbouring CIS states. The most important 
factors are the level of social-economic development (such as high purchasing capacity 
of large groups) and low social mobility. These aspects are insufficiently considered in 
modern national anti-narcotic policy. The emphasis is on strengthening the national 
borders and forming «security belts» at the Russia- Kazakhstan borderland. But, as will 
be demonstrated later, considering the volume of the national illicit drug market, only a 
tiny fraction of narcotics are seized at borders. In other words, border regions do not 
play a decisive role in the structure of narcotic consumption in Russia. 
                                            
9
 Calculated on the basis of: [Ministry of the Internal Affairs, 2005]. 
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2 Organization of Smuggling Process 
2.1 Methods of Smuggling and the Structure of Criminal Groups Involved 
Crossing borders is the most risky stage of drug-trafficking. It forces smugglers to 
use special tactics, and to constantly modify their strategies and techniques. The 
commonest methods used but discovered by law enforcement structures can be 
divided into the following:  
• Masking drugs in large consignments of transported vegetables and fruits 
(including inside these products), industrial goods and raw materials;  
• Concealment inside human bodies (swallowing etc.);  
• Concealment in baggage, under clothes and inside shoes;  
• Creating hiding places in cars, lorries and the carriages of trains;  
• Concealment in packaged products and industrial goods, including factory 
wrapping and built-in hiding places; 
• Throwing down drugs before arrival at checkpoints; later accessories pick them 
up. 
In order to further mask their cargo, criminals try to create favorable impression by 
using representatives of “less suspicious” social groups as couriers. Large amounts of 
narcotics are transported by women, children, pensioners (sometimes even veterans of 
the Great Patriotic War), representatives of "European” ethnic groups (Russians in 
particular) and so on. The organizers of large-scale smuggling operations in the 
direction Kazakhstan-Azerbaijan-Russia prefer to use Russian vehicles and drivers 
because vehicles with Azeri or Kazakh license plates, can be stopped and inspected at 
almost every checkpoint of the road police.
10
 
Several examples can be used to support the contention that high status of couriers 
is systematically relied on to mask illegal cargo. Probably the most remarkable case 
took place on October 14th 2005 at the Russia-Kazakhstan border checkpoint 
«Sagarchin» during the examination of «Jeep» having a diplomatic license plate. The 
driver of the car, an employee of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was trying to 
smuggle 380 kg of narcotics including 362 kg of heroin. In this case, a combination of 
the above-mentioned smuggling methods was used: drugs were transported in a 
                                            
10
 Information from the interview with Mrs. Tatiana Beklemishcheva, a Deputy Director of the Main 
Directorate for the Fight against Smuggling of the Federal Customs Service. She was interviewed by 
Yana Denissova in February of 2005. 
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specially equipped steel tank under the car and their presence was masked by the 
smell of onion and vinegar. [Narkotiki 2005: 2]. 
In many respects, the method of transportation is determined by the peculiarities of 
the transborder drug dealing organization. Individualists, small groups, as well as major 
groupings which control all stages of supply, can be involved in smuggling. In the post-
Soviet period one of the main trends of transboundary narco-trafficking has become the 
growing influence of organized crime, branching groupings in contrast to individualists 
and small groups. These organised groups aim to control smuggling and sales. A 
considerable part specializes in several kinds of trans-boundary criminal activity, e.g. 
smuggling other goods. At the same time small criminal groups, often supported by 
relatives or ethnic links, still dominate the Eurasian drug trafficking. Large hierarchical 
cartels of monopolists, controlling all operations in the drug market still have not 
appeared. The process of centralization is hampered by the breadth of the field for their 
activities, the necessity to survive in a hostile environment (centralized structures are 
easier to discover) and even by the unwritten norms of the criminal community. 
According to these norms, drug-trafficking is a condemned occupation that restrains 
the involvement of organized criminals in this process. In supplying drugs to Russia 
large groups divide the traffic into several stages with different carriers involved; in 
some cases these carriers act as second-hand dealers. Within such a scheme drugs 
are delivered to a fixed place and passed to another courier who pays his or her partner 
money for the work done. It is very difficult to discover such criminal networks and it 
reduces the effectiveness of the "force strategy. It is often conceded that in most 
situations only small-scale traffickers (“camels”/“verbliudy” in slang), dealers 
(“pushers”), and consumers are detained. Such persons are also prosecuted in the 
majority of criminal cases. Arrests of ordinary couriers do not pose serious damage to 
narco-business as it is not very difficult to hire new carriers. This makes it unsurprising 
that the tactical achievements of power structures can do little to change the long-term 
situation: organized criminality both in Russia and neighbor post-Soviet countries 
simply redesigns its strategy and tactics in response to actions by the authorities. 
Sometimes criminal groups provide official structures good indices for their reports 
by exposing inveterate drug addicts to police or servicemen at border control. Criminal 
groups use to recruit representatives of professions and occupations whose status or 
professional skills help smugglers surpass control at borders. Among such professions 
are railwaymen, conductors of trains, passenger bus drivers, and workers of enterprises 
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producing wrappers. Many inhabitants of border areas are also recruited to participate 
in this criminal business. They can relatively easily orientate themselves at localities, 
becoming well informed about the regimes of Border Guard and Customs Services’ 
work. For a considerable proportion of local inhabitants at border areas, illegal 
transboundary operations is almost the sole source of significant income. 
The success of drug-trafficking operations often depends on corrupt ties between 
drug dealers and state officials. Criminals try to penetrate into Border and Customs 
services, Gosnarkokontrol and some structures of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Some 
officials are sure that smugglers frequently have advance information of operations 
prepared against them. The grounds for corruption in structures counteracting trans-
boundary drug trafficking is very serious. Firstly, such officials have relatively small 
salaries while corrupt ties offer possibilities to make a very quick and often very large 
profits. For instance, an officer letting pass a large amount of narcotics can immediately 
become the owner of an apartment or a very good car. Secondly, Customs and 
especially Border Guard services have serious cadre problems: for example, the local 
structures of the Border Service are recruited from inhabitants from border localities 
who have many informal connections with their countrymen. 
The fight against corruption is often very complicated with the problem of 
establishing criminal intent in such officials' actions: in many cases the success of a 
criminal operation relies on a state official to be just inattentive or not enough diligent at 
a certain moment. That is why his or her actions can be estimated as negligence or 
administrative violation of law, not resulting in criminal responsibility. At least, a corrupt 
official may be unaware of the exact nature of a smuggled cargo. 
2.2 The Importance of Ethnic Factors 
According to a stereotype widely held in both power structures and public opinion, 
drug dealing is a field in which some ethnic groups, especially Tajiks, Gipsies, Azeris, 
and Chechens, specialize. Unfortunately, officials often have a friendly, neutral, and 
even favorable attitude towards the mass media (including state and even departmental 
ones) that equates these groups with the narcodealers. Such ideas essentially 
contribute to a decrease in the level of tolerance in Russian society. 
This situation requires a thorough and impartial analysis of the importance that 
ethnic factors have in illicit drug dealing. Unfortunately, having almost no access to the 
corresponding office files, the author often had to rely on interpreting indirect statistical 
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information and using trustworthy expert estimations of the structural organization of the 
drug-trafficking process. 
As it will be shown below, the law enforcement structures are only able to discover a 
paltry share of the demand for hard drugs in Russia. This makes it rather doubtful that 
the corresponding statistical data on seizure could even be a partially adequate 
reflection of the structure of drug dealing. This information can mirror, on the one hand, 
the more successful activity of police and security agencies against some criminal 
groups including the mono-ethnic groupings, and, on the other hand, greater lenience 
of some drug-trafficking mechanisms in respect to others. The representatives of 
«visible» ethnic minorities from Central Asia evidently attract more attention during 
customs and other inspections. It thus seems very probable that attempts at smuggling 
by representatives of such groups are discovered more frequently than similar attempts 
made by persons having an «European appearance». 
If the assumption that the statistical data on drug-related seizures is a partial 
reflection of the real structure of drug dealing, then rather contradictory conclusions can 
be reached. At first sight, the analysis allows us to assert that Russian citizens, in the 
majority ethnic Russians, rank first in terms of numbers of seizures, Ukrainians rank 
second, and citizens of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan rank below these two. 
This correlation is regularly reflected in the annual reports of Federal Customs Service 
[Tamozhnya 2004] and reports of other agencies. Such statistical information doesn't 
show however, the importance of ethnic factor in the trafficking of heroin which is the 
most dangerous hard drug. It should be also taken into account that a significant part of 
drug-related arrests is provided by small scale retailers (including many consumers) 
and drug addicts themselves who were detained for possession of too large doses. 
Therefore, an analysis of the ethnic structure of drug-related arrests does not provide a 
reliable indication of the composition of transboundary drug-trafficking criminal groups. 
Despite these shortcomings, event analysis of Internet news items concerning 
seizures at the Russia-Kazakhstan border gives some idea on the structure of drug 
smuggling.
11
 In almost 60% of cases the traffickers were citizens of Russia or 
                                            
11
 The analysis was carried out by Sergey Golunov, Yana Denissova, and Liudmila Reshetnikova within 
research projects «Drug Trafficking as a Challenge for Russia-Kazakhstan Border Security» and 
«Transboundary Crime through Russia's Borders with Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan: 
Social and Political Effects». These projects were co-ordinated by the Center of Regional and 
Transboundary Studies of Volgograd State University in 2004-2005 and supported by the Transnational 
Crime and Corruption Center (American University, Washington, D.C., USA) and 
were headed by the author. 
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Kazakhstan but in the majority of these cases they were trying to smuggle cannabis. At 
the same time, almost all the smugglers from Tajikistan and Usbekistan as well as the 
majority of Kyrgyzstani smugglers were detained for trafficking of opiates. Tajikistan 
ranked first by the citizenship of persons arrested for trafficking of heroin and raw 
opium, Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan were second, third and fourth respectively. 
An attempt to analyse the ethnic structure of these arrests raises the possibility that the 
number of Russians and representatives of other «European» ethnic groups detained is 
comparable to the number of Tajiks, Uzbeks, and other «ethnic Central Asians». 
The statistical information on drug-related crimes committed in Kazakhstan in 2004 
can be also interpreted in different ways. The citizens of Kazakhstan committed 94,5 % 
of such crimes while the citizens of Russia 2,5%, of Kyrgyzstan 1,8%, Uzbekistan 1%, 
and Tajikistan only 0,3%. The structure of confiscations made was similar: 96% was of 
cannabis drugs and only 4% (including 2% of heroin and 2% of raw opium) was of 
opiates. Of course, this doesn't imply any direct connection between the analyzed two 
groups of indices, but such a correlation makes it statistically improbable that the 
contribution of Central Asian ethnic minorities to the trafficking of hard drugs is less 
than the contribution of Russian citizens and «European» ethnic groups.  
A contrary assertion can be easily placed in serious question by analyzing 
qualitative information on seizures of extremely large quantities of heroin. At present, 
Border Guard and Customs services are able to discover approximately 1 ton per year 
while all law enforcement structures discover roughly 4 tons. In the above mentioned 
case of the official from the Russian Foreign Ministry attempting to smuggle 360 kg of 
heroin in a car with a diplomatic license plate, such a volume represents one third of all 
the drugs seized at all national borders, and one tenth of the drugs discovered by all 
Russian law enforcement structures combined, and, as mentioned earlier, evidently 
larger share of narcotics are confiscated from ethnic migrants. The Russian post-Soviet 
borders, including the Russia-Kazakhstan boundary, are crossed by millions of people, 
motor vehicles and thousands of trains. It is highly likely that tens of extremely large 
amounts of drugs are successfully smuggled by groups with very different ethnic 
compositions. If this assessment is correct, then monoethnic criminal groups are just 
the tip of the iceberg. 
If the statistical data on drug seizures does not support any definite conclusions on 
the role of Central Asian ethnic criminal groupings in smuggling of hard drugs to 
Russia, do the organizational mechanisms for drug-trafficking allow for such 
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conclusions? As mentioned, the structure of drug dealing includes the production, 
trafficking to wholesale markets, and retail, being dividing into numerous constituents. 
Both inter-related and independent criminal groups of different scales operate at the 
each of these stages. A part of them is mono-ethnic while another one is inter-ethnic. A 
situation whereby different stages of the drug trafficking process are controlled by 
various groupings of both kinds is rather typical. 
Ironically, the stereotype which is widespread in Estonia is that the issues of 
narcomania and drug dealing are predominantly Russian. This takes into account the 
fact that the majority of drug addicts live in Ida-Virumaa district where the share of 
ethnic Russians is especially high. This example demonstrates that the attempt to 
represent drug dealing as a traditional occupation of some ethnic minorities can easily 
act as a boomerang. 
Taking into account the poly natured structure of drug dealing in which elements 
often compete to supply illegal wholesale or consumer markets, weakening one kind of 
group should almost inevitably (due to the superprofitability of the business) result in 
the substitution of weaker units by more viable ones. 
It appears that the introduction of a visa regime for citizens of Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan can only have a short-term positive effect for Russian 
security although in the beginning this effect may appear significant. As the U.S. 
Experience showed, toughening policy towards remote South American countries who 
were the producers of cocaine resulted in a reinforcement of the drug cartels in 
neighboring Mexico. Hence, a flexible and pluralistic structure of drug-trafficking can 
respond to similar toughening of Russian policy making Kazakhstan the key 
intermediate center.  
The effectiveness of trafficking mechanisms can be restored very quickly while 
ethnically Russian drug mafia will use the opportunity to get rid of some competitors 
and strengthen its lobbyist influence on Russian power structures. The accusation of an 
ethnic group in drug dealing logically means that, at least more than a half of this group 
participates in this process, especially at the stages of wholesale delivery and/or retail. 
The estimated capacity of the heroin market is about 150-300 tons a year while the 
supposed number of migrants from Tajikistan to Russia is 600-800 thousand per 
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annum.
12
 If a half of Tajik migrants would supply 100 tons of heroin to Russian illegal 
market, each of them should smuggle 250-300 gram as a minimum. It is difficult to 
suppose that such a concentrated accumulation of narcotics transported by large 
crowds, certainly already regarded as risk group by law enforcement structures would 
remain undiscovered. It indirectly means that only a minority of Tajik migrants 
participate in drug-trafficking to Russia. The number of representatives of other visible 
ethnic minorities such as Uzbeks, Azeris, Chechens, Gypsies arrested for smuggling, is 
significantly smaller suggesting that there is little ground to associate any ethnic group 
with drug dealing. 
According to representatives of law enforcement, certain schemes which are used 
by organized criminal groups belie the idea of the mono-ethnic character of drug 
trafficking. In many cases the traffic supposedly is divided into several stages: at the 
end of each one the illicit cargo is loaded to another vehicle having a new driver who 
pays off the previous courier [Golunov et. al.:27-28]. In this case the Russia-
Kazakhstan border is crossed by a vehicle having Kazakhstani, or (that is better) 
Russian license plate and then driven by a citizen of Russia or Kazakhstan; otherwise, 
such a vehicle will attract increased attention at almost every road police post. The 
flexibility of drug traffickers, who can be familiar with regulations of border regime and 
can change from routes that are more risky, are frequently noted by law enforcement 
officials. But these features imply not only the inter-ethnic character of a criminal 
organization but also that its ‘brain’ is not situated in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan or 
Uzbekistan but in Kazakhstan or Russia itself. If one assumes that these organizations 
are headed by Tajiks or Central Asian migrants with Russian citizenship, the 
involvement of other ethnic groups necessarily diminishes the share of Central Asians 
in the smuggling process. Again, it provides no grounds for making entire ethnic groups 
responsible. 
The statements of some experts from law enforcement agencies also introduces 
another conclusion. According to these statements, in many Russian provinces 
(including the regions bordering with Kazakhstan) there are no criminal groups 
specializing only in trading opiates.
13
 But this many-sided specialization assumes a 
                                            
12
 Appraisal of the First Deputy of Russian Federal Migration Service I. Yunash from his statement at the 
meeting with journalists from CIS countries in September of 2004. See: [Tajikistan National Informational 
Agency, 2004]. 
13
 For example, this opinion was expressed by the Head of Orenburg province Branch of 
Gosnarkokontrol interviewed by the author on 30 September 2004. 
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capability to penetrate different fields that can be easier achieved easier if the 
composition of such groups is multi-ethnic. 
In many respects the grounds for ethnic criminal groups involved in drug trafficking 
undoubtedly exists and grows due to marginal status of many migrants to Russia. 
During a long time they have to pass through numerous and humiliating bureaucratic 
procedures often involving extortion. Many migrants are unable to meet all the legal 
requirements and this is very profitable for some law enforcement officials who 
systematically take advantage, all the while, stressing their importance as a «shield 
against the rush of aliens». In these circumstances migrants often have to rally around 
influential people having money and important social ties, but these people (including 
representatives of regional ethno-cultural organizations' leadership) are often involved 
in drug dealing and co-ordinate trafficking. It provides representatives of law 
enforcement agencies an additional cause to allege that some ethnic groups specialize 
in drug-trafficking. This argument, however, is based on no more correct premises than 
the previous one. 
3 Ways of Problem Solving 
Within the international arena, there are three main ways to struggle with narco-
trafficking and its consequences:  
• restriction measures including strengthening of border and customs control;  
• demand reduction programs (social advertising, health protection, active policy 
towards the youth);  
• harm reduction (prevention of overdoses, AIDS, and other diseases directly or 
indirectly caused by narcomania; social protection of drug addicts etc.) that means 
control over consumption of drugs  
• limited legalization of some drugs. 
To all appearances, it is just the first variant with the stress on the necessity of 
“hard-edged struggle against drug-trafficking” which has been chosen in Russia. This 
strategy is apparently the most popular both in power structures and in public opinion. 
The complex of concrete measures includes strengthening of technical and 
organizational potential of force structures, the development of informational databases, 
equipping of border checkpoints, and the establishment of new cynological centers. 
These activities require essential increase of funding that is sometimes achieved at the 
expense of other important spheres (education, health, support of activities of children 
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and the youth) that have a direct or indirect importance in the struggle against 
narcomania. 
The increasing support for a “restriction policy” has brought some fruits reflected in 
the essential growth of statistical indices concerning the numbers of arrests and the 
volume of seized drugs. Trying to prove that increasing financial and other support 
could bring about more serious results, advocates frequently refer to the US experience 
that organizes expensive operations which result in seizures of impressive volumes of 
cocaine and other illicit drugs. 
However, the effectiveness of restriction policies both in Russia and in many other 
countries (not excluding the USA) is often low compared to their financing. Even when 
they are sharply increased, they rarely bring a commensurable reduction in supply. 
International experience shows that as a rule law enforcement agencies are able to 
seize no more than 10% of supplied illicit drugs yet only a confiscation rate of 70%, can 
significantly undermine the profitability of the narco-business. 
An approximate evaluation of the effectiveness of Russian law enforcement 
agencies leads to an even less optimistic conclusion. Basing on very moderate expert 
estimations and assuming that an average Russian heroin addict, the total number of 
which is 1 million, consumes 0,5 g. daily, the demand for heroin in Russia is more than 
180 tons annually. As mentioned earlier, the South East Branch of the Federal Border 
Guard Service seized an average of 500 kg per year during its entire existence. In 
2003, the Federal Customs Service confiscated 488 kg of heroin [Federal Customs 
Service 2004a], in 2004 more than 680 kg [Federal Customs Service 2004].  This 
means that the total volume of heroin confiscated annually by the Russian Border 
Guard and Customs services is less than 1 % of the market demand. It is also evidently 
less than the volume of seizures in Tajikistan where in 2004 4794,1 kg of heroin (it is a 
share equivalent to 2.6% of the mentioned demand) was seized [The Review of Central 
Asia 2005]. The total volume of heroin confiscated by all law enforcement agencies at 
Russian borders and inside the country in 2001-2003 did not exceed 1 ton annually. In 
2004 it was 3,897 ton while in 2005 – more than. Additionally, 2058 kg of raw opium 
(from which 200 kg of heroin can be produced) was seized in 2004 [Tendentsii 2005: 8, 
19]. 
These figures mean that law enforcement agencies are currently able to seize no 
more that 2,5% of the volume demanded by the Russian heroin market and that this is 
slightly less than the volume of heroin confiscated in Tajikistan. It raises serious doubts 
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about the adequacy of the current national anti-narcotic policy whereby the main 
financial and organizational resources are concentrated in the hands of the police and 
militarized structures. By similar reasoning the idea that the withdrawal of Russian 
troops from Tajikistan will have catastrophic consequences for national security, only 
partially prevented by the closure of the Russia-Kazakhstan border is also not the case 
(see the final section «7 myths»). 
It seems that one of the main weaknesses of the restrictive strategy is its reliance on 
security and police agencies. It has an excessive administrative staff machinery and 
numerous armies of low-paid employees but it is ill equipped for fighting drug-
trafficking. In May 2004, President Vladimir Putin admitted that about 40 000 personnel 
in Russia are directly involved in this field while in the USA the corresponding number is 
about 10 000 [Rodnaya gazeta 2004: 6]. In the same year, it became known that up to 
80 percent of financial resources and staff of certain Border Guard regional branches 
were concentrated in their managing departments [Krasnaya zvezda 2004]. Such 
structures are very vulnerable against corruption: proposed bribes can be hundred 
times greater than salaries. 
As both Russian and U.S. experience shows, an intolerant repressive policy can 
promote the strengthening of ties between drug addicts and criminal communities, 
increasing death rates due to overdoses and infection diseases and worsening inter-
ethnic relations. In Russia and the USA, repressive measures are often directed mainly 
towards representatives of ethnic minorities. Even such apparently positive 
consequences of the restrictive policy, such as an increase in prices for hard drugs can 
have unfavorable spin-offs including sudden jumps in the rate of street crimes (as 
addicts need larger amounts of money) and the number of deaths caused by cheaper 
but lower quality narcotics. 
The main alternative to the restrictive policy is to reduce demand focusing on health 
protection, youth policy, social advertising, and other such measures. This assumes the 
active involvement of non-governmental structures such as anti-narcotic foundations, 
sport clubs, religious organizations. The psychological ground for demand reduction is 
to support important social aims which divert young people away from drugs or create 
powerful stimuli for surpassing drug addiction. 
Unfortunately, the effectiveness of many officially supported anti-narcotic programs 
is low, frequently taking the form of Soviet style agitation which is conducted by 
bureaucrats with few relevant qualifications. This agitation often only provokes interests 
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in drugs amongst teenagers. But even those effective demand reduction measures are 
usually under financed. For example, in Orenburg oblast, they were funded only by 12 
percent for 2003 and by 6 percent for the first half of 2004. 
The new Federal Program “Complex Measures for Counteraction to Drug Abuse 
and their Illicit Circulation” adopted in September 2005 [Federal'naya Tselevaya 
programma 2005] can be regarded as demonstrating some shift towards demand 
reduction. The Program has a very ambitious aim to diminish the number of drug 
addicts in Russia by 20 percent while the estimated volume of confiscated drugs should 
be increased from 8,9 to 10,7 percent. The Program’s budget of $ 108,2 million is to be 
distributed among Gosnarkokontrol (41 percent), the Ministry of Health and Social 
Development (12 percent), the Agency “Rospechat” (8 percent), the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Ministry of Education (7 percent for each one), the Federal Security Service, 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Federal Sport, Physical Culture Agency (4 percent for 
each one), the Customs Service (0,6 percent), and other agencies. It should be noted 
that since 2006 the greater share of funds allocated to Gosnarkokontrol will be spent for 
social advertising and other forms of propaganda. Around $ 107,8 million of these funds 
is destined for direct distribution among NGO’s. As the Program aims for the “creation 
of the unified system of positive moral values determining the negative attitude towards 
illicit drug consumption”, it seems, however, that many of its actions may well take the 
shape of another centralized Soviet style agitation without serious effect. 
The main problem is that the budget is too small to achieve the targeted aims. At the 
same time, the financing of anti-narcotic agencies in 2006, according to the national 
budget’s project, is 14 times (of these structures’ management alone - “only” 2,1 times) 
as big as the funds allocated for this Program for the same period. On the other hand, if 
the complex of mainly social measures aiming to diminish drug addiction by 20 percent 
has the four-year funding of $ 107,8 million, the need in state antinarcotics bodies, for a 
budget of $ 299,2 million for 2006 only is rather doubtful [Prilozheniye 8 2005]. Taking 
into account the huge share of expenses for national security in 2006, this program 
cannot be regarded as a crucial turn from a restriction towards a demand reduction 
based strategy. The importance of harm reduction as a strategy against narcomania 
and drug-related crime in Russia is not only underestimated but also often perceived by 
officials and public opinion as indirect encouraging of consumption. Such a distorted 
perception (of course, for a healthy person a possibility to get gratuitous treatment is 
not a very powerful stimulus to fall sick), combined with a widespread contemptuous 
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attitude towards addicts, impedes any serious estimation of the advantages of this 
strategy. In the Netherlands, this approach is considered as important an element of 
national drug control policy as demand reduction [Synthetic Drug Trafficking 2003: 74]. 
Although, the restrictive approach can often force addicts towards organized crime, 
effective social and medical supports can make a part of this huge army loyal or, at 
least, neutral in fight between the state and drug mafia. It is also important that harm 
reduction measures can diminish the number of deaths caused by overdoses, 
infections by AIDS and hepatitis. No wonder that in the Netherlands this number is less 
than the number of deaths from alcohol and tobacco consumption. On the whole, the 
effectiveness of restrictive measures by Russian law enforcement is paltry in 
comparison to the levels of hard drugs consumption.  
Taking into account the problems caused geography and other factors, there are no 
serious grounds to believe that the effectiveness of the current restrictive approach will 
increase. Within the national anti-narcotic policy the main stress should be on social 
measures, including demand reduction and harm reduction programs. 
4 Conclusions 
7 myths 
Myth 1. Narcomania is an epidemic spreading throughout Russia and the 
country is verging on catastrophe. In order to stop this, extreme measures, such 
as granting extraordinary powers to the police and militarized structures, are 
required. 
By the estimations of the UNO experts, in recent years the level of hard drugs 
consumption has stabilized (2005 World Drug Report: 59). The damage caused by 
narcomania is great for Russia but it is commensurable with the similar detriment of 
alcoholism or tobacco smoking. This suggests that these problems should not have 
such different priorities at the national level. Additionally, the exaggerated estimations 
of the scale of narcomania in Russia call into question whether the law enforcement 
and security agencies have or will have in the future any real efficiency in combating 
narco-trafficking. If we agree that the number of drug addicts in Russia can be up top 6 
million (the maximal figure provided by high-ranking officials) the majority of which (2/3 
or even more) areaddicted to heroin, this means that only approximately 0,2% of total 
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Russian market is seized at the national borders and if all the law enforcement 
structures taken together, then the figure rises to just 0,6%. 
Myth 2. The level of drug consumption is the highest in those regions and 
cities situated near problem borders or at trafficking routes. 
Actually, consumption is highest in the regions and major cities where purchasing 
capacity is high and social mobility is low. The latter feeds the sense of hopelessness 
among broad groups of population (e.g.miners). It seems that approximately there are 
20 major cities where about 50% or more of drug-related activities can be found. 
Myth 3. To defeat drug-trafficking, Russia should close its borders with the 
Asian countries of the CIS. 
As mentioned, if border officials seize only 0,5-1% per year of the demand of 
Russian illegal market, an increase in the number of heroin addicts' makes this share 
even less favorable. A decrease in numbers of addicts diminishes the importance of 
transboundary drug-trafficking issue for Russian national security. It should be taken 
into account that, even according to official estimations, the largest share of drugs are 
brought into Russia through existing checkpoints. The majority of these are controlled 
not much better than the space between them. To achieve effective control of other 
post-Soviet boundaries would mean not only barrierization of this space but also the re-
equipment of checkpoints and higher salaries for the enlarged staff of border guards 
and customs officials. Taking into account the huge length of Russian borders, these 
measures could become an excessive burden for the Russian budget. Any softer 
decision will not allow any significant increase in the share of seized hard drugs. 
Myth 4. Some ethnic minorities, especially Tajiks, specialize in drug-
trafficking. 
Only a minority of Central Asian migrants, including Tajiks, are involved in the 
supply of illicit drugs to Russian market. Their numbers are insufficient to satisfy the 
demand of this market which would require every migrant to carry 0,15 kg (the fewer 
the numbers involved the more the drugs will have to be re-distributed among the rest). 
Such a high concentration of heroin in such migratory flows, which are already 
considered as higher risk groups, would be highly unlikely to remain undiscovered. 
Besides, even several successful smuggling of large quantities (attempts at 250-360 
kg are already known) can easily outweigh the total annual volume of confiscations 
from Central Asian migrants. It is known that the traffic of such quantities is organized 
by representatives of different nationalities and ethnic groups. As for cannabis drugs, 
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the statistical information on seizures cogently shows that ethnic minorities do not have 
a crucial importance in trafficking. 
Myth 5. A typical drug addict is a natural ally of drug mafia. 
Well-considered social policy, including harm reduction programs can noticeably 
reduce the dependence of addicts on illegal supplies as well as reduce incentives to 
earn money by criminal ways. 
Myth 6. Russia should use, at first, the experience of countries (USA, Iran, 
China etc.) that rely on rigid restriction measures. 
Most of these countries have far less lengthy problem borders. It's no wonder that 
the restrictive policies of such countries are far more effective than Russia, although no 
country has been able to stop the increase of supply and consumption of drugs by 
restriction measures alone. 
Myth 7. Police and militarized structures should be at the head of the struggle 
against narcomania in the Russian Federation. 
According to moderate experts, the combined law enforcement agencies are able to 
seize slightly more of 2% heroin demanded by Russian illicit market. An increase in the 
number of heroin addicts will reduce this share for law enforcement agencies while a 
decrease in numbers raises doubts whether extraordinary measures are required to 
counteract heroin traffic from Afghanistan through Central Asia. Taking this into account 
means that the mentioned structures have no sufficient ground to claim leadership in 
national anti-narcotic policy. In addition, it should be noted that a rigid restriction policy 
divorced from well-considered social measures (migration, youth policy, medical etc.) 
can worsen inter-ethnic relations, lead to periodical jumps in the rate of street crime, 
increase the spread of AIDS and infectious hepatitis even beyond the environment of 
addicts, increase death rates from overdoses, and rally drug addicts and some other 
socially marginal groups (e.g. ethnic migrants) to the criminal communities. 
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5 Recommendations 
5.1 For Executive Power (Government, President Administration etc.): 
1) Taking into account the low effectiveness of restriction measures, Russian anti-
narcotic policy should take into account the experience of EU and other countries and 
be re-orientated to stress demand and harm reduction and. It should be carried out by 
competent people and coordinated by the Ministry of Health and Social Development. It 
is necessary to re-distribute the proportion of funding from power unit of anti-narcotic 
policy (in which now the overwhelming share of resources is concentrated) to the social 
one. It will also be necessary to establish transparent independent monitoring to enable 
better estimations of the real state of affairs concerning narcomania. 
2) The role of restrictive policy, including border security, should be an auxiliary one, 
based on real objectives such as the creation of maximal obstacles to functioning of 
large-scale trafficking. 
3) The functions of the State Agency for the Control over Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances should not be “everything related to the issue of illicit drugs” but towards 
strategic planning, better coordination of governmental bodies' activities and 
supervision over these activities in order to increase effectiveness and fight drug-
related corruption. 
4) Instead of creating a security belt in the Russia-Kazakhstan borderland it would 
be better to focus on pilot projects for roughly 10 regions and/or the 20 major cities 
most affected by narco-mania. Within such a project the main stress should be demand 
reduction (especially as regards youth policy), harm reduction (in order to decrease the 
dependence of drug addicts on organized crime), undermining the economic 
mechanisms of drug-related crime, experiments on structural reforms of law 
enforcement bodies and on law application practice. 
5) Within the supply reduction unit of the national anti-narcotic policy the highest 
priority should be on supporting customs bodies. 
6) The key condition for effective law enforcement measures lies in close 
cooperation between corresponding agencies of Russia and Kazakhstan. Within these 
co-financed programs, those that would complicate the functioning of the main 
trafficking routes and the illegal wholesale markets in Kazakhstan, should have the 
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highest priority. A unification of standards and priorities within national anti-narcotic 
policies can contribute essentially to the effectiveness of joint measures. 
5.1 For Customs and Border Guard Services 
1) The highest priority should be technical and organizational improvement of 
control at multilateral checkpoints at the Russia-Kazakhstan border and a struggle 
against corruption in Customs service. As a first step, these checkpoints should get 
modern equipment for scanning cargo and for thorough inspection of people (especially 
citizens of third countries) crossing this border. 
2) Transboundary passenger trains from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are 
badly inspected. Three or four railway stations could be constructed at the Russia-
Kazakh border or on Kazakhstan's southern boundaries, where all passengers would 
be obliged to pass through strict controls including a change of trains. This could create 
serious obstacles for small and middle-scale trafficking groups and reduce the criminal 
constituent of Central Asian migration. 
3) Wage increases together with a toughening of personnel selection and service 
requirements would be the main directions in the struggle against corruption. 
5.3 For Law Enforcement Structures 
Taking into account the Dutch experience, the idea of differentiating criminal 
responsibility for dissemination of hard and soft drugs deserves serious consideration. 
Perhaps, this idea can be tested within law application practice at the local level. Such 
measures and other indirect means of regulation can stimulate criminal groups to 
redirect themselves from traffic of heroin and other hard drugs to other lower risk or less 
socially harmful activities. 
 
 
5.4 For Federal Migration Agencies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
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In order to diminish the role of the ethnic factor in drug-related transboundary 
organized crime, there should be strict border control in combination with benevolent 
attitude to law abiding migrants. This would be aimed at preventing their marginalization 
and involve easing of the registration process and help in job placement. These actions 
would be coupled with the creation of an all-national database on “undesirable 
migrants”. 
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Appendix 1 
Geography of narcotics consumption and drug-related crimes in Russian regions (1999-2004) 
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Symbolic Notations 
Regions distinguished by the greatest numbers of officially registered drug addicts  
Regions distinguished by the greatest numbers of officially registered drug-related 
crimes 
Regions distinguished by both absolute and relative indices of officially registered drug 
addicts and drug-related crimes 
 
Regions marked by figures: 
1 – Altai krai; 2 – Irkutsk province, 3 – Kemerovo province, 4 – Khanty-Mansiysky 
Autonomous District, 5 – Krasnodar krai, 6 – the city of Moscow, 7 – Novosibirsk province, 8 – 
Primorsky krai, 9 – Rostov province, 10 – the city of St. Petersburg, 11 – Samara province, 12 – 
Sverdlovsk province, 13 – Tiumen province, 14 – Tomsk province. 
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Appendix 2 
Top ten Russian Provinces by the numbers of officially registered 
drug-addicts and drug-related crimes in 1999-2004 
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*The information concerning regions especially distinguished by both absolute and relative 
indices in 1999-2004 is marked by the bald font. 
